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Learn / Deals and M&A / How an M&A sale process works

How an M&A sale process works

Premieur Institute · Read time: 15 minutes

The stages of a sell side process from preparation to closing, who does what at each one, how long it takes and how a seller compares competing bids.

Contents

Three ways to sell a companyThe stages and how long they takeWho does whatHow a seller compares bidsExclusivity, leverage and the buyer's playbook

Most private companies of any size are sold through a process run by an investment bank on behalf of the seller. The bank prepares the company for scrutiny, finds the buyers most likely to pay the most, controls what each of them sees and when, and keeps several of them bidding against each other for as long as possible. The process is designed to produce two things at once: the highest price and the highest certainty that the deal will actually close.

For a buyer, especially a private equity firm, understanding the process is not optional. Each stage has its own rules, deadlines and documents, and a bidder who misreads them either overpays to stay in or is knocked out before it has done the work to know what the company is worth. Sponsors see hundreds of processes a year and win a small fraction, so knowing when to push and when to walk away is part of the craft.

This topic walks through the three main process formats, the stages from preparation to closing with typical timings, the roles of the banker, the sponsor, the strategic buyer and the lawyers, and how a seller compares bids that differ in more than price, with a worked comparison.

Key takeaways

  • A broad auction maximizes competition, a targeted auction trades some competition for confidentiality, and a bilateral negotiation trades competition for speed and certainty.
  • A typical auction runs roughly four to six months from launch to signing, then weeks to months more to closing, depending on regulatory and financing conditions.
  • The first round narrows the field on indications of interest; the second round, with full data room access and a draft purchase agreement, produces binding bids.
  • Bids are compared on equity proceeds to the seller and on certainty, not on headline enterprise value: working capital pegs, deferred consideration and financing or regulatory risk all change what a bid is worth.
  • Exclusivity is the moment leverage shifts from seller to buyer, so the seller tries to settle every important term before granting it.

Three ways to sell a company

In a broad auction the bank contacts a long list of potential buyers, often fifty to a hundred or more strategic acquirers and financial sponsors. Wide outreach makes it more likely that the buyer with the highest valuation is in the room, and competition pushes each bidder toward its best price. The cost is confidentiality: the more parties who know a company is for sale, the more likely competitors, employees and customers hear about it, and the more management time is spent on meetings with buyers who never bid.

A targeted auction contacts a short list, perhaps five to twenty parties chosen because they are most likely to pay well and able to close. It keeps much of the competitive tension with less disruption, and is common when the natural buyers are obvious or when the business is sensitive to leaks. A bilateral, or negotiated, sale deals with one buyer at a time. It is fastest and most discreet, and suits a seller who values certainty, a buyer with a clear strategic reason to pay up, or a founder who wants a particular partner. Its weakness is that the seller has no live alternative to test the price against.

Hybrids are common. A bank may run a targeted process and let a strong bidder pre-empt it with an offer high enough to end the auction early, in exchange for a short exclusivity period. Sponsors often try to pre-empt because it lets them avoid a bidding war; sellers accept only when the pre-emptive price beats what they expect the full process to produce.

Sale process formats compared
FeatureBroad auctionTargeted auctionBilateral negotiation
Parties contactedDozens to 100 or moreRoughly 5 to 20One at a time
Price tensionHighestHighLowest, unless a credible alternative exists
ConfidentialityLowestModerateHighest
Management timeHeaviestModerateLightest
Speed to signingSlowestModerateFastest
Typical fitAssets with many plausible buyersClear buyer universe, leak sensitiveObvious strategic fit, founder preference, carve outs

The stages and how long they take

Preparation comes first and is often underestimated. The bank and management build the financial model and the equity story, the seller may commission a sell side quality of earnings report so that the numbers survive diligence, and counsel cleans up corporate records and material contracts. A weak preparation phase shows up later as price chips, when buyers find problems the seller should have found first.

The launch sends a teaser, a short anonymous description of the business, to the target list. Interested parties sign a non disclosure agreement (NDA), which for sponsors usually also contains a non solicitation clause covering the company's employees, and receive the confidential information memorandum (CIM), a detailed document covering the business, the market, the management team and the financials with management's projections. Round one ends with non binding indications of interest (IOIs), typically a valuation range with the basis for it, the financing plan and the diligence still required.

The bank then cuts the field to a handful of bidders for round two. These parties get management presentations, access to the virtual data room, site visits and expert sessions, and a draft purchase agreement prepared by seller's counsel. Round two ends with final bids, a fixed price plus a markup of the purchase agreement and evidence of financing. The seller picks a winner, sometimes after a last round of best and final offers, and either signs directly or signs a letter of intent (LOI) that grants exclusivity while the definitive documents are finished. Signing is followed by closing once the conditions are met, such as antitrust clearance under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, whose initial waiting period is 30 days, and other regulatory approvals.

A typical auction timetable (indicative weeks; real processes vary widely)
StageWhat happensTypical durationKey document
PreparationModel, equity story, sell side QoE, buyer list, legal clean up4 to 8 weeksCIM, sell side QoE
Launch and NDAsTeaser sent, NDAs negotiated and signed2 to 3 weeksTeaser, NDA
First roundBidders study the CIM and model, build a view on value3 to 5 weeksProcess letter, IOI
Second roundManagement presentations, data room, site visits, confirmatory work4 to 8 weeksData room, draft SPA
Final bids and selectionBinding bids with SPA markup, best and final round1 to 2 weeksFinal bid letter
Exclusivity and signingNegotiate definitive agreement, finish confirmatory diligence2 to 6 weeksLOI, SPA
Signing to closingAntitrust and other approvals, financing, third party consents0 to 12 weeks or moreClosing statement
A deal with no regulatory filing can sign and close on the same day. A deal that needs extended antitrust review or foreign investment approval can take many months between signing and closing.

Who does what

The sell side banker runs the process: writing the CIM, building the buyer list, managing the data room, setting deadlines in the process letter, fielding every question and, above all, managing the bidders' perception of competition. Its fee is mostly a success fee as a percentage of transaction value, so it is paid to close a deal at a high price. Seller's counsel drafts the purchase agreement and disclosure schedules, and the seller's accountants support the QoE and the working capital analysis.

A private equity sponsor bids with a deal team that coordinates its own advisers: a buy side QoE provider, legal counsel, often a commercial diligence firm, and specialists for tax, insurance, IT, environmental and benefits issues. It arranges acquisition debt, typically with commitment letters from banks or private credit lenders delivered with the final bid, and it pays for all of this work whether or not it wins. That cost is one reason sponsors guard their time and ask early for the information that would kill the deal.

A strategic buyer, an operating company in the same or an adjacent industry, often has a higher capacity to pay because it can count synergies, and can sometimes fund the purchase from its balance sheet. But it may raise antitrust questions, need its own board approval, and move more slowly. Sellers also worry that a strategic competitor uses the data room to learn about the business, so commercially sensitive information is often released to competitors only late, through a clean team of advisers who cannot share it with the buyer's operating staff.

Roles in a sell side process
PartyMain jobWhat it wants
Sell side bankerRun the process, market the company, manage biddersA closed deal at the highest price
Seller and managementPresent the business, answer diligence, negotiatePrice, certainty, terms for management and employees
Seller counselDraft SPA and disclosure schedules, limit seller liabilityClean exit with minimal post closing exposure
Financial sponsorValue, diligence and finance the dealA price that meets its return target, protection on what it cannot verify
Strategic buyerValue including synergies, plan integrationStrategic fit, synergies, manageable regulatory risk
LendersCommit acquisition financingLeverage and covenants supported by diligenced EBITDA
Buyer counsel and advisersDiligence, SPA markup, financing documentsProtection for the client against unknown risks

How a seller compares bids

Two bids with the same headline enterprise value can be worth very different amounts to the seller. Bids are normally made on a cash free, debt free basis with a normal level of working capital, so the seller's equity proceeds are the enterprise value, less the net debt that the buyer will take over or repay, less the seller's transaction costs, plus or minus the difference between the working capital actually delivered at closing and the target level (the peg) the bidder proposed. A bidder who sets a higher peg is quietly cutting its price.

Form of consideration matters next. Cash at closing is worth its face value. An earnout, a payment contingent on future performance, is worth its expected value discounted for time and for the risk that the buyer runs the business in a way that misses the target. Stock in the buyer carries the buyer's own share price risk. Rollover equity, where the seller reinvests part of the proceeds, keeps the seller exposed to the outcome of the deal.

Finally, certainty. A bid with committed financing, no antitrust concerns and a clean markup of the purchase agreement is more likely to close than one that needs regulatory approval, has softer financing or rewrites the seller's draft. Bankers often frame this as a probability of closing, which is a judgment, not a measurement, but making it explicit forces the comparison onto common ground.

Equity proceeds from a cash free, debt free bid
Equity proceeds = Enterprise value - Net debt at closing - Seller transaction costs + (NWC delivered - NWC peg) Risk weighted value = (Equity proceeds + PV of deferred consideration) x Probability of closing
Net debt at closing
Funded debt and debt like items less cash, as defined in the purchase agreement.
NWC peg
The target level of net working capital the bidder expects to receive; a shortfall reduces the price dollar for dollar, an excess increases it.
PV of deferred consideration
Earnouts, deferred payments or seller notes, weighted for the probability of payment and discounted for time.
Probability of closing
The seller's judgment of financing, regulatory and execution risk.
Worked example

Harwick Industrial Services: comparing three final bids

  • Harwick Industrial Services, a hypothetical provider of maintenance services to US factories. LTM adjusted EBITDA $50m. Figures in $m.
  • Net debt at closing $150m. Seller transaction costs $10m. The seller expects to deliver net working capital of $40m, its normal trailing level.
  • Bid A (sponsor): EV $600m all cash at closing, peg $40m, committed debt financing. Probability of closing judged at 95 percent.
  • Bid B (strategic): EV $625m, 20 percent of equity proceeds paid in buyer stock, peg $48m, likely second request from antitrust authorities. Probability of closing judged at 85 percent.
  • Bid C (sponsor): EV $600m cash at closing plus an earnout of $40m payable in two years if EBITDA reaches a target. Peg $40m, committed financing, 95 percent. The seller puts a 50 percent chance on the earnout paying and discounts it at 10 percent.
  1. 1. Headline EV/EBITDA
    A 600 / 50; B 625 / 50; C 640 / 50 including the full earnout
    12.0x; 12.5x; 12.8x
  2. 2. Bid A equity proceeds
    600 - 150 - 10 + (40 - 40)
    $440.0m
  3. 3. Bid B equity proceeds
    625 - 150 - 10 + (40 - 48)
    $457.0m
    Of which 20 percent, $91.4m, is in buyer stock.
  4. 4. Bid C cash equity proceeds
    600 - 150 - 10 + (40 - 40)
    $440.0m
  5. 5. Bid C earnout, expected and discounted
    40 x 50% / 1.10^2
    $16.5m
  6. 6. Bid C total value
    440.0 + 16.5
    $456.5m
  7. 7. Risk weighted, Bid A
    440.0 x 95%
    $418.0m
  8. 8. Risk weighted, Bid B
    457.0 x 85%
    $388.5m
  9. 9. Risk weighted, Bid C
    456.5 x 95%
    $433.7m

Bid B has the second highest headline and the highest proceeds before risk, yet ranks last once its higher peg and regulatory risk are counted. Bid C ranks first on these assumptions, but its lead over Bid A rests entirely on an earnout the seller does not control. A seller who weighs certainty heavily may go back to Bidder A and ask it to close the $15.7m gap in cash.

Exclusivity, leverage and the buyer's playbook

Until a winner is chosen, the seller holds the leverage: every bidder knows that a rival may be one turn of EBITDA higher. Once the seller grants exclusivity, usually for 30 to 60 days, the winning bidder is alone, and anything it finds in confirmatory diligence can become a reason to reduce the price or add protections. This is why sellers push to settle the purchase agreement markup, the working capital peg and the financing before exclusivity, and why experienced buyers try to keep some issues open.

Sponsors have their own discipline. They do enough work in round one to know whether the deal can meet their return target at the likely clearing price, drop out early when it cannot, and concentrate their diligence budget on the few processes they can win. A sponsor that wins too many auctions is often paying too much. A sponsor that keeps losing at the final round may be underwriting too conservatively, or showing up with weaker certainty than rivals: a clean markup and committed financing can beat a slightly higher price.

Where this goes wrong

Mistakes buyers and sellers make in auctions

Comparing bids on headline EV without normalizing pegs, debt definitions and deferred consideration. Treating an IOI range as a commitment, and then being re-traded when the final bid lands at the bottom of the range. Granting exclusivity before the purchase agreement is substantially agreed.

On the buy side: spending the full diligence budget before knowing whether the price is achievable, and winning on price by accepting deal terms the investment committee later refuses. A bid that has to be re-traded after exclusivity damages the sponsor's reputation with the bank in every later process.

In practice

UK and European practice

Auctions in the UK and Europe follow the same stages, but many deals price on a locked box rather than on closing accounts. The price is fixed from a historical balance sheet date and the seller promises that no value has leaked to it since, so there is no post closing working capital true up. Public takeovers in the UK run under the Takeover Code, with its own timetable and disclosure rules.

The rule

The one-line summary

A sale process converts competition into price and certainty; the seller wins by keeping bidders comparable and competing until the last term is settled, and the buyer wins by knowing its walk away price before the process forces it to decide.

Templates for this lesson

Included with a Premieur membership.

  • WordBlind teaser and CIM outlineA one page anonymous teaser, then a confidential information memorandum outline saying what each section should hold.Download
  • WordMutual NDAAn illustrative mutual non disclosure agreement for an M&A process, with drafting notes. Not legal advice.Download
  • ExcelDue diligence request listA buyside tracker of 72 requests across eight workstreams with owners, due dates, status, data room references, overdue flags and an aging of what is still outstanding.Download
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